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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1743 
___________ 
 
STRATTON PEAY, 
                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPT. J. FISHER; L. OLIVER; DEPUTY J. WHITESEL;  
CAP’T A. GOSS; SGT. CRUM; SGT. HENRY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-15-cv-00345 ) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 23, 2018 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 12, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Stratton Peay, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order granting 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants in this civil rights case.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm.  
I. 
 Peay is a Pennsylvania prisoner currently serving a life sentence for his 1999 
conviction for third-degree murder.  In February 2015, Peay commenced this action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants—six prison officials and staff 
members at the Smithfield State Correctional Institution—had violated his constitutional 
rights in several respects.  These defendants were: Jon Fisher, the SCI-Smithfield 
Superintendent; Jay Whitesel, the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services; 
Lonnie Oliver, the Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management; Captain Nathan 
Goss; Sergeant Kenneth Crum; and Sergeant William Henry.   
In the complaint, which he later amended, Peay claimed that: (1) defendants 
Fisher, Whitesel, Oliver, and Goss failed to protect him from being assaulted by two 
fellow inmates on April 29, 2014; (2) prison staff members tampered with his mail in 
retaliation for his assertion that he is innocent of the crime for which he is incarcerated; 
(3) all defendants allowed his Nike sneakers and a box of oatmeal to be stolen from his 
cell, and allowed his food to be poisoned with herpes; (4) defendant Goss confiscated his 
Walkman in retaliation for his having implicated staff in a fraudulent misconduct charge 
against him; (5) defendant Henry, who was “in charge of the housing unit,” failed to 
protect him from being poisoned with herpes; (6) the prison failed to have a policy about 
cell-cleaning; (7) defendants Fisher, Whitesel, and Oliver refused to remove his “Z-code 
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status” even though they knew he was claustrophobic; and (8) he was wrongfully found 
guilty of fighting with an inmate in a misconduct.  Peay sought compensatory and 
punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.   
 Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on multiple 
grounds, including that Peay had failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to 
most of his claims; that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; and that Peay 
had failed to create a genuine issue for trial on his failure-to-protect, retaliation, 
conditions-of-confinement, and herpes-related claims.  The District Court carefully 
considered the defendants’ arguments and Peay’s responses thereto, and, by order entered 
March 24, 2017, granted the defendants’ motion.  Peay appealed.  
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over an order granting summary judgment.  DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 
262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).  Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of 
that party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 
455 F.3d 418, 422–23 (3d Cir. 2006).  To defeat the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment, Peay was required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, 
admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing a genuine issue for trial.   See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c) (setting forth requirements for supporting or opposing party’s assertion that 
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a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed).  Ultimately, “[w]here the record taken as a 
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 
genuine issue for trial.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
587 (1986). 
III. 
 We have reviewed the record and will affirm the District Court’s judgment 
primarily for the reasons explained by that court in its thorough opinion.  We will briefly 
address some of Peay’s arguments on appeal.  
 First, insofar as Peay argues in his brief to this Court that he is innocent of the 
crime for which he is currently imprisoned, he may not challenge the validity of his 
conviction indirectly through § 1983.  See Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 677 (3d Cir. 
2010) (explaining that, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), “a 
prisoner does not have a cognizable § 1983 claim, even if he or she does not seek relief 
from the fact or duration of confinement, for alleged unconstitutional conduct that would 
invalidate his or her underlying sentence or conviction unless that conviction has already 
been called into question”). 
Second, we agree with the District Court that the defendants were entitled to 
judgment on all of Peay’s claims based on his contention that prison employees poisoned 
him with herpes.  As the District Court explained, the medical records produced by the 
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prison include a lab report revealing that Peay tested negative for the herpes simplex 
virus on June 17, 2014.  Peay did not produce any medical evidence to the contrary.1   
We also agree with the District Court that the defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment on Peay’s Eighth-Amendment failure-to-protect claim.  Peay alleged that on 
April 29, 2014, prison staff directed two of his fellow inmates—Reyes and Wilson—to 
attack him.  He claimed that defendants Fisher, Whitesel, Oliver, and Goss were 
responsible for the attack because he had previously advised them that prison staff were 
“sicking” inmates on him.  To succeed on this claim, Peay would be required to 
demonstrate that: “(1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of 
serious harm, (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his 
health and safety, and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused him harm.”   
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 834 (1994)).   
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted the 
record of Peay’s grievance concerning this incident.  At the final stage of the 
administrative process, the Chief Grievance Officer found that, following an investigation 
by the Security Office Staff and the Office of Special Investigations and Intelligence, no 
evidence supported Peay’s theory that prison staff were behind the inmate assault.  The 
Chief Grievance Officer explained that the prison staff members who were implicated in 
                                              
1 As the District Court accurately described, the lab results and progress notes that Peay 
submitted do not reflect a positive diagnosis for the herpes simplex virus. 
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the incident denied Peay’s accusations, and Wilson and Reyes stated that they attacked 
Peay because he “had been coming at them for a month, [and they had] had enough.”  
Given that Peay did not present any evidence in the District Court to create a genuine 
issue for trial as to whether prison staff ordered the assault, he could not show that the 
defendants had reason to know that he was in danger from these two inmates, or that they 
were deliberately indifferent toward this danger.  Therefore, the District Court properly 
granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.  
 We also agree with the District Court that the defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment on Peay’s claim that defendants Fisher, Whitesel, and Oliver refused to remove 
his Z-code (single-cell) status because they knew that he was claustrophobic and wanted 
him to suffer.2  The District Court reasonably construed Peay’s allegations as alleging an 
Eighth Amendment violation.  To succeed on this claim, Peay would be required to 
demonstrate that: (1) objectively, the conditions were so serious that they constituted a 
denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) subjectively, the 
prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference.”   Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Where conditions are not “cruel and unusual” but merely 
“restrictive and even harsh,” they do not violate the Eighth Amendment, but rather “are 
                                              
2 Pursuant to Section 5.C.1.d. of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy 
Statement No. 11.2.1, staff members should consider Program Code “Z” housing 
classification for an inmate who “has a documented history of aggressive or predatory 
behavior towards cell partners or who staff have reason to believe would exhibit 
assaultive or predatory behavior towards cell partners.” 
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part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”   
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). 
In support of their motion for summary judgment on this claim, the defendants 
submitted evidence indicating that Peay requested to have his Z-Code status removed in 
March 2014 because he was claustrophobic and no longer wanted to be in a cell by 
himself.  At that time, pursuant to the Reception and Classification Procedures Manual, a 
Corrections Counselor reviewed Peay’s file and found that he had a significant 
misconduct history—which included misconducts for assaulting staff and other inmates.  
The Corrections Counselor also obtained recommendations from prison staff who all 
voted to maintain Peay’s Z Code, noting that he was “highly assaultive.”  Peay did not 
provide any evidence to support his theory that prison officials maintained his Z Code in 
order to cause him to suffer.  Because Peay did not present any other evidence that his 
cell assignment placed him at substantial risk of serious harm or that the defendants were 
deliberately indifferent to his health or safety, he failed to meet his burden to survive 
summary judgment on this Eighth Amendment claim.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see 
also Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that placing an 
inmate in restricted housing does not violate the Eighth Amendment “as long as the 
conditions of confinement are not foul, inhuman or totally without penological 
justification”). 
Peay’s remaining arguments on appeal concern claims that the District Court 
could not consider because they were not exhausted.  As the District Court explained, 
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Peay was required to pursue all avenues of relief available within the prison’s grievance 
system before filing this federal civil rights suit.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 
534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).  The record reflects that Peay filed grievances within the 
prison system addressing many of the complaints he raises here, including his claims 
relating to the handling of his legal mail, the theft of his Walkman and sneakers, the 
herpes poisoning, and the April 29, 2014 altercation.  For the reasons set forth by the 
District Court, however, Peay failed to fully complete the grievance process, or failed to 
identify the named defendants, with respect to these claims.  Furthermore, he did not file 
any grievances at all relating to his claim that a box of oatmeal was stolen from his cell or 
his claim regarding the cleaning of cells at SCI-Smithfield.  Because § 1997e mandates 
“proper exhaustion,” the District Court correctly concluded that Peay failed to satisfy the 
mandatory exhaustion requirement.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006); see 
also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).   
IV. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
